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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of the submission of undisclosed limit orders and their short‐term 
information content compared to similar disclosed orders. We also examine whether the abolishment of 
broker identifiers from trading screens on the Australian Securities Exchange affects the short-term 
information content of various order types. Results indicate that aggressively submitted undisclosed 
orders, compared to similar disclosed-limit orders, lead to significantly higher short-term price 
movements. The removal of broker identifiers does not provide consistent evidence of any changes in the 
short-term information content of large dollar volume orders. This suggests that disclosed orders provide 
more information to the market than do broker identifiers. 
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and their short‐term information content compared to similar disclosed orders. 
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The role of a limit-order book for a fully order-driven market, such as the 
Australian Securities Exchange (ASX), is to provide a central trading platform for the 
simultaneous submission, execution, cancellation and amendment of orders. Investors 
provide liquidity in an order-driven market through the submission of orders, but are 
susceptible to a number of exposure risks. For any limit-order trader, various exposure 
risks can include i) being front-run by other orders, ii) risk of non-execution, iii) 
revealing their trading intentions to the market and iv) trading with informed traders 
(D’Hondt, De Winne & Francois-Heude 2003). To overcome the exposure of 
revealing limit orders in the order book, many exchanges worldwide have introduced 
a hidden limit order (HLO) type.2 Hidden orders placed in the order book alter an 
important attribute of trading, allowing traders to protect their trading intention from 
other market participants (in particular, actions of herding or mimicking of trades). 
From an exchanges point of view, the introduction of hidden orders allows greater 
flexibility for investors, potentially attracting greater depth in the order book. Pardo 
and Pascual (2003) documented the use of hidden orders within the Spanish Stock 
Exchange, finding that hidden orders are used as a tool to mitigate information-
asymmetry risk for liquidity suppliers. Anand and Weaver (2004) investigated hidden 
orders on the Toronto Stock Exchange and found that hidden orders increase the 
inside depth of the order book.  
While international markets enable investors to place hidden orders, each 
exchange differs in its rules of execution and disclosure limits.3 The characteristics of 
HLOs on the ASX (undisclosed limit orders (ULOs)), differ from hidden orders (e.g. 
iceberg-type orders) implemented in many other financial markets in three major 
areas. First, ULOs do not sacrifice time priority in the order book, while iceberg 
orders do. Second, after submission of a ULO, the designation ’/u’ is placed in the 
quantity field in the order book, while iceberg orders exist as a single disclosed order 
with a specified quantity. Third, once the ULO dollar value falls below $200,000, it 
simply exists as a disclosed limit order (DLO).4 Iceberg orders exist as a limit order 
with a partial fraction of the total volume disclosed in the order book. Once this 
disclosed portion is executed, the iceberg order replenishes itself in the order book 
and this process continues until the order quantity is exhausted.  
Several papers examine the use of HLOs on the ASX. Aiken et al. (1996) 
found that in 1993 a total of 6% of all submitted orders were hidden, accounting for 
28% of total volume. Aitken et al. (2001) found that the use of hidden orders on the 
ASX reduces the option value of limit orders; specifically, that the submission of 
ULOs is negatively related to the relative tick size and trading activity, but positively 
related to volatility and order value. They also found no evidence that ULOs are more 
frequently used by informed traders than DLOs. Aiken et al. (2003) observed that the 
main determinants of the size of a submitted ULO are confounded by both price 
volatility and liquidity levels. They suggested that the occurrence of a ULO in stocks 
may provide a signal of the possibility of a new information event in the market. 
Allen et al. (2007) examined the price impact of the submission of ULOs and matched 
these orders to similar DLOs and MOs. Their findings suggest that large-dollar orders 
have a significant price impact on the order book (for the first ten minutes), but when 
                                                 
2 Hidden orders represent both iceberg and undisclosed order types. 
3 See for example, Comerton-Forde and Rydge (2006) for details about hidden order properties used 
within Asia-Pacific Stock exchanges. 
4 The minimum dollar order value of a ULO is $200,000. See Aiken et al. (2001) for changes in 
undisclosed threshold limits on the ASX.    





comparing ULOs to similar DLOs and MOs, no significant return differences are 
evident.  
Several studies examine HLOs from many internationally recognised 
exchanges. First, Harris (1996) showed that 74% of all submitted orders for 300 
stocks traded on the Paris Bourse are not fully disclosed when the order size is greater 
than FF500,000. Degryse (1999) found that on the Brussels CATS, hidden orders 
account for over 16% of all submitted orders in the order book. Furthermore, 
Hasbrouck and Saar (2002) found that approximately 3% of all hidden orders are 
executed on the Island Electronic Communication Network (ECN). This small 
percentage, however, equates to 12% of all order executions. For stocks belonging to 
the CAC40 index, D’Hondt, De Winne and Francois-Heude (2003) found that 
approximately 5% of all submitted orders contain a hidden component. Additionally, 
they found that hidden depth accounts for over 45% of total depth available at the best 
five quotes. Finally, Anand and Weaver (2004) found that on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange, submitted hidden orders account for approximately 7% of total submitted 
volume.  
This paper departs from previous studies by examining the short-term price 
impact of hidden orders surrounding the introduction of broker anonymity on the 
ASX. The impact of broker anonymity is thoroughly documented in the literature. 
Foucault, Moinas and Thiessen (2007) examined the effect of broker anonymity on 
Paris Euronext and found that quoted bid-ask spreads decline and quoted depth 
decreases when broker IDs are withheld. Similarly, Comerton-Forde and Tang (2009) 
examined market quality when the ASX moved to an anonymous regime and found 
three major improvements in market quality: i) reduction in quoted spreads, ii) 
increase in quoted depth and iii) greater order flow. The ASX removed broker 
identifiers from orders on November 28, 2005, thus providing a natural experiment to 
examine whether the reduction in pre-trade transparency affects the preference (and 
information content) of hidden orders.  
The rationale for abolishing broker identifiers on the ASX was to create an 
anonymous trading arena for traders; this was in line with many international 
exchanges moving to opacity.5 Broker identifiers provide valuable information in the 
limit-order book; for example, they explicitly offer free information in the trading 
process (O’Hara 1995). The information content revealed through broker identifiers is 
another example of exposure risk that a limit-order trader faces. Intuitively, the 
submission of a hidden order in the post-anonymity period should serve as a ‘double’ 
concealment from exposure risk, as both the broker identity and order quantity are 
concealed. The focus of this study is to assess the market’s response to the submission 
of hidden orders around this market reform. 
Results indicate that aggressively placed hidden orders incur significant price 
impact compared to similar DLOs within the first 10 minutes of submission. Further 
examination of hidden orders around broker anonymity finds limited evidence that 
additional information is contained in broker identifiers for large-dollar orders. 
Numerically, return differences are negligible after the removal of broker identifiers 
across both order directions and all levels of order aggressiveness. Finally, the results 
for comparable hidden orders surrounding the change to anonymity reveal 
inconclusive evidence for the value of broker identifiers. Return differences for 
                                                 
5 The exception has been the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE), which moved from opacity to a 
transparent market by revealing broker identifiers on October 25, 1999. 




hidden orders are insignificant across both order directions and across all levels of 
order aggressiveness.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the 
data and method and develops several testable hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the 
empirical results, while Section 4 concludes.  
2. DATA DESCRIPTION  
The order-by-order data are provided by the Security Industry Research Centre of 
Asia-Pacific (SIRCA), which allows for the full reconstruction of the limit-order book 
during the sample period. The data include every order submitted on all traded equity 
securities on the ASX from 30 May, 2005 to 26 May, 2006. For each order, the data 
comprise information on price, order quantity, timestamp (to the nearest hundredth of 
a second), direction (either a buy or a sell), prevailing best bid and ask at the time the 
order was submitted and an identifier indicating how the order was submitted (either 
as an ULO, MO or DLO).6 Since the ASX opens with a pre-auction (at 10am) and 
closes with a pre-close auction (at 4pm), the dataset captures normal trading activity 
from 10:30 to 15:30 to avoid any potential bias from these auctions.  
The method for examining the information content of ULOs stems from the 
methodology described in Allen et al. (2007), who examined the information content 
of ULOs based on various levels of order aggressiveness categories. Instead of 
examining trades, they considered order placement to be more informative. Empirical 
studies such as Biais, Hillion and Spatt (1995), Pascual and Veredas (2003) and 
Ranaldo (2004) all considered order flow as informative at various levels of 
aggressive trading strategies. Coppejeans and Domowitz (2002) showed that trades in 
the order book have different information content compared to submitted orders, and 
highlighted the information content behind order cancellations. Walsh (1997) 
provided empirical evidence suggesting that order flow is more informative in terms 
of information content than trades on the ASX. Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) and 
Kaniel and Liu (2006) suggested that the order book contributes to price discovery.  
Price submission reaction is likely to differ for various order types at various 
levels of aggressiveness. Three explicit levels of order aggressiveness are examined in 
this paper: 
1) Aggressive limit order (ALO) – orders submitted at or better than the best 
price on the same side of the book, but less than the best price on the opposite 
side; 
2) Less-aggressive limit order (LALO) – orders submitted behind the best 
price, but within two ticks of the best price on the same side of the book; 
3) Aggressive limit order cancellation (ALOC) – orders cancelled while 
positioned at the best price of the order book. 
This paper matches a submitted ULO to a similar DLO and MO, where the 
only defining difference is how the orders are submitted. A successful match of a 
DLO or MO must be 1) within 10 percent of dollar volume to the submitted ULO; 2) 
submitted within 30 days of the ULO but be within 10 minutes of the submitted ULO; 
3) be in the same direction to the ULO (i.e. the same side of the order book); 4) 
submitted in the same position of the order book as the ULO; and 5) the same order 
category as the ULO (i.e. the matching order to the ULO is either submitted, as with 
                                                 
6 We also have order number in the dataset, thus allowing us to identify how the order progresses in the 
order book.  





an ALO or LALO, or deleted, as with an ALOC).7 Additionally, we extend the Allen 
et al. (2007) methodology by matching on stock code (i.e. the matching DLO or MO 
is the same stock as the ULO), keeping the information content between orders firm-
specific. Finally, we match by event period: the successful matched order is submitted 
in the same event period, either before or after the removal of broker identifiers. Any 
ULOs that do not satisfy all of the above criteria are deleted.  
Short-term returns are calculated at intervals of 1, 2, 5 and 10 minutes by 
capturing the price movement on the opposite side of the order book of the submitted 
order. The use of the opposite-side quotes avoids the problem of capturing 
improvements in the original quote resulting from an increased supply of liquidity of 
new limit orders, as this improvement does not necessarily reflect any new order 
information in the order book (Aiken et al. 2001).  
For buy orders, the short-term order return is: 

























where t = 1, 2, 5 and 10 minutes after the submission of the ULO. For market 
orders, the same-side quote is used to calculate the short-term return; in other words, 
for a buy order the log of the prevailing bid price after 1, 2, 5 and 10 minutes is 
divided by the log of the prevailing bid price when the order was initially submitted. 
Finally, the day-close return is calculated as: 
 














Refining the matched order dataset, any returns greater than 10% within the 
first 10 minutes are removed from the matched dataset. Any returns greater than 10% 
are not likely linked with the submission of the ULO, but rather attributable to a firm-
specific announcement or an unwarranted trading activity. Also, we remove orders 
that have a current stock prevailing bid price below $1.50.8  
 
2.1 Hypothesis Development  
 
In an order-driven market, limit orders are essential for liquidity provision. However, 
liquidity suppliers/demanders are faced with various types of exposure risk when 
submitting limit orders at their desired price and quantity. The likely candidates using 
ULOs in their strategies are informed traders or large, patient traders covering their 
trading position by taking advantage of the hidden element of the order type (Allen et 
                                                 
7 These matching criteria originate from Aiken et al. (2001), and were developed to measure the 
information content of ULOs compared to DLOs.  
8 There is no explicit reason why the prevailing bid price is used as a reference. Removing the stocks 
with prevailing bids below $1.50 removes only 3% of all matching orders from the dataset. Stocks with 
prevailing bid prices below $1.50 are mostly illiquid stocks on the ASX that exhibit strong deviations 
in returns in the short horizon. To further test this we remove stocks with prevailing bid prices below 
$2.00; the results mimic that of the presented analysis.  




al. 2007). Distinctively on the ASX, the order quantity of a ULO is hidden, not the 
submission.9 We hypothesise that the submission of ULOs contains additional 
information, specifically in terms of the short-term price movement, in comparison to 
matched DLOs and MOs, while keeping the level of pre-trade transparency constant. 
Specifically, we hypothesise: 
 
H1: The mean price reaction between ULOs and matching DLOs or MOs is 
significantly different (keeping transparency constant). 
 
The removal of broker identifiers is commonplace across exchanges 
worldwide. The question arises in this study whether the movement by the ASX to a 
more opaque regime causes any changes in the information content between the 
matched orders. Before broker anonymity, traders could identify the submission of 
orders by brokers; this in turn gave market participants a more educated guess about 
whether orders were possibly informed. Since the removal of broker identifiers from 
trading screens, the question proposed is whether the information content of hidden 
orders changes when the market cannot infer which brokers are taking these positions. 
Specifically, we hypothesise: 
 
H2: The mean price reaction between ULOs and matching DLOs or MOs is 
significantly different surrounding the removal of broker identifiers.   
 
The use and availability of hidden orders are important for exchanges as they 
allow investors to take large positions without disclosing their total order volume to 
the market. The removal of broker identifiers from trading screens allows us to 
examine whether the short-term price reaction of ULOs differs with the switch to 
anonymity:    
 
H3:  The mean price reaction to ULOs is significantly different with the 
removal of broker identifiers. 
   
3. RESULTS   
Table 1 reports the number of matches from the criteria described in Section 2. 
Results are reported for before ("pre") and after ("post") the event, across both trade 
directions of the submitted order (buy and sell) and across the levels of order 
aggressiveness (ALO, LALO, ALOC and MO).10 In total, there are 5,170 matched 
orders between ULOs and both DLOs and MOs. Table 2 presents summary statistics 
for all orders that are matched across the entire dataset.11 Univariate results shows 
similarity for various order-placement strategies across a number of measures. The 
average trade size is $902,000 for ULOs,  $822,000 for DLOs and $423,000 for MOs. 
Execution costs measured by dollar-quoted spreads are $0.0135 for ULOs, $0.0130 




                                                 
9 The flagging of the symbol “/u” in the order book highlights the presence of a ULO order with a 
dollar volume of at least $200,000.  
10 For market orders the only order-aggressiveness type is ALO.  
11 "Matching orders" refers to matches between ULO and DLO and between ULO and MO. 






Number of Matches 
This table reports the number of matches that result between ULOs and DLOs, and between ULOs and 
MOs. Figures are reported for six months before ("pre") and after ("post") the event date of anonymity 
across each order direction and order-aggressiveness type. The various levels of order aggressiveness 
examined are aggressive limit order (ALO), less-aggressive limit order (LALO), aggressive limit order 
cancellation (ALOC) and market order (MO), respectively.  
 
Order Aggressiveness Type Event Period Number of Matches 
Panel A: Buys   
ALO PRE 877 
 POST 939 
   
LALO PRE 163 
 POST 234 
   
ALOC PRE 38 
 POST 56 
   
MO PRE 199 
 POST 192 
   
Panel B: Sells   
ALO PRE 848 
 POST 794 
   
LALO PRE 134 
 POST 208 
   
ALOC PRE 28 
 POST 46 
   
MO PRE 219 
 POST 195 
 
Tables 3 and 4 examine the differences in percentage returns from placing a ULO 
compared to a similar disclosed order.12 The differences in returns capture the 
additional information content that the market perceives from the submission of 
ULOs. Table 3 provides results of the mean differences in percentage returns for buy 
orders. The ALO type indicates strong statistical disparity between matched orders 
(i.e. ULOs and DLOs). The positive mean return differences indicate, on average, a 
greater movement in the best ask price after the submission of ULOs compared to 
DLOs. We find these significant differences are consistent in both the pre- and post-
anonymity periods. This possibly signals the presence of informed traders or a new 
information event not reflected in current prices. For the other order-aggressiveness 
types (LALO, ALOC and MO), no significance return differences are documented.  
                                                 
12 Effects from differences in firm size are negligible in this study: 75.9% of orders fall under the 
category of the top 20 actively traded ULOs in the dataset. Anand and Weaver (2004) suggest that 
hidden-limit orders occur in the most active stocks, where the chance of non-execution is small.  Since 
the dataset is dominated by the top 20 ULO stocks, which consequently are highly liquid stocks on the 
ASX, differences in firm capitalisation are not likely to affect results.   
 






Summary Statistics: Matched Orders 
This table reports summary statistics for all matched orders. The summary statistics capture average 
dollar volume, bid-ask spread, proportional bid-ask spread and daily volume across the mean, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum for each order type, respectively.  
 






of Obs.     
Panel A: Average volume ('000) (per order) 
 ULO 822 1028 200 12030 5170 
 DLO 902 1155 200 11700 4365 
 MO 423 369 200 4052 805 
       
Panel B: Bid-ask spread (dollars) 
 ULO 0.0135 0.0097 0.0010 0.1400 5170 
 DLO 0.0130 0.0096 0.0010 0.1500 4365 
 MO 0.0125 0.0072 0.0050 0.1000 805 
       
Panel C: Proportional bid-ask spread (%) 
 ULO 0.17 0.22 0.01 4.88 5170 
 DLO 0.17 0.23 0.01 4.65 4365 
 MO 0.12 0.11 0.01 1.05 805 
       
Panel D: Daily average volume ('000) (per day) 
 ULO 777 314 249 2433 251 
 DLO 851 356 285 2182 251 
  MO 394 295 201 3090 251 
 
The results for sell orders in Table 4 are consistent with the findings for buy orders. 
The significant differences in returns are witnessed within the ALO type across both 
event periods. The negative mean return differences indicate, on average, a greater 
movement in the best bid price after the submission of ULOs compared to DLOs. 
Neither LALOs, ALOCs nor MOs show any evidence of returns differences.  
The second hypothesis examines whether the change in pre-trade transparency 
has any effects on the short-term information content between ULOs to DLOs and 
ULOs to MOs. Table 5 presents results for buy and sell orders across all order 
aggressiveness types. For ALO-type buy orders, there is no conclusive evidence that 
the reduction in pre-trade transparency affects return differences. That is, the 
differences in returns in the information content of ULOs compared to DLOs before 
and after the removal of broker identifiers is negligible. For instance, the change in 
mean return differences for aggressive matched orders at the 1-minute interval is         
-0.004%, at 2 minutes 0.011%, at 5 minutes -0.017% and at 10 minutes 0.009%. The 
only significant difference in returns (at the 10% significance level) is attributable to 
market orders at the 5- and 10-minute intervals. As with buy orders, sell-order results 
indicate no significant changes in the short-term information content after the removal 
of broker identifiers. This suggests that broker identifiers provide no additional 











Buy Orders: Mean Difference in Returns 
This table summarises the results of the mean return differences across all order-aggressiveness types 
for the matches established between ULOs to DLOs for buy orders. Panel A (Panel B) presents the 
result for the pre- (post-) anonymity period. The levels of order aggressiveness examined are 
aggressive limit order (ALO), less-aggressive limit order (LALO), aggressive limit order cancellation 
(ALOC) and market order (MO). Values in parentheses are t-values for the null hypothesis that the 
difference in the mean is zero. All return differences are expressed as percentages. 
 
Buy Orders Order Type 
Time Interval 
1 min 2 min 5 min 10 min Day Close 
Panel A: Pre-anonymity       
        (ULOs - DLOs) ALO 0.027 0.038 0.024 0.034 -0.024 
  (2.92) (3.78) (1.97) (2.34) (-0.60) 
       
 LALO 0.023 0.022 0.034 0.065 0.136 
  (1.39) (1.54) (1.25) (2.10) (1.45) 
       
 ALOC -0.018 -0.022 0.021 0.000 0.114 
  (-0.37) (-0.41) (0.60) (0.00) (0.73) 
       
(ULOs - MOs) MO 0.017 0.022 -0.039 -0.032 0.042 
  (1.36) (1.35) (-1.10) (-1.46) (0.54) 
       
Panel B: Post-anonymity      
(ULOs –- DLOs) ALO 0.031 0.027 0.041 0.024 -0.112 
  (4.42) (3.31) (4.15) (2.07) (-2.49) 
       
 LALO 0.001 -0.006 -0.008 0.002 0.071 
  (0.11) (-0.49) (-0.53) (0.08) (0.83) 
       
 ALOC 0.015 0.050 -0.008 0.057 0.256 
  (0.36) (0.95) (-0.19) (0.76) (1.17) 
       
(ULOs - MOs) MO 0.007 -0.003 0.034 0.034 -0.136 




















Sell Orders: Mean Difference in Returns 
This table summarises the results of the mean return differences across all order-aggressiveness types 
for the matches established between ULOs to DLOs for sell orders. Panel A (Panel B) presents the 
result for the pre- (post-) anonymity period. The levels of order aggressiveness examined are 
aggressive limit order (ALO), less-aggressive limit order (LALO), aggressive limit order cancellation 
(ALOC) and market order (MO). Values in parentheses are t-values for the null hypothesis that the 
difference in the mean is zero. All return differences are expressed as percentages. 
 
Sell Orders Order Type 
Time Interval 
1 min 2 min 5 min 10 min Day Close 
Panel A: Pre-anonymity       
(ULOs - DLOs) ALO -0.023 -0.019 -0.033 -0.058 -0.083 
  (-3.40) (-2.14) (-2.67) (-3.74) (-1.97) 
       
 LALO -0.009 -0.009 -0.004 -0.009 0.131 
  (-1.11) (-0.81) (-0.25) (-0.44) (1.11) 
       
 ALOC 0.003 -0.020 -0.030 -0.081 -0.052 
  (0.05) (-0.38) (-0.41) (-0.61) (-0.25) 
       
(ULOs - MOs) MO -0.010 -0.014 -0.022 -0.028 -0.104 
  (-1.58) (-1.58) (-1.57) (-1.60) (-1.39) 
       
Panel B: Post-anonymity       
(ULOs - DLOs) ALO -0.027 -0.036 -0.043 -0.029 -0.030 
  (-3.83) (-4.51) (-4.40) (-2.16) (-0.71) 
       
 LALO -0.009 -0.004 0.000 0.025 0.024 
  (-0.70) (-0.31) (0.01) (0.96) (0.29) 
       
 ALOC 0.010 0.032 -0.002 0.039 0.191 
  (0.21) (0.54) (-0.04) (0.67) (1.38) 
       
(ULOs - MOs) MO -0.014 -0.019 -0.017 -0.021 -0.117 
    (-1.22) (-1.31) (-0.94) (-0.79) (-1.10) 
 
 
The final hypothesis tests whether the same information content is attributable within 
hidden orders surrounding anonymity. Table 6 presents the results for buy and sell 
orders across various levels of order aggressiveness. For both buy and sell orders we 
find no significant differences in returns for hidden orders across all order-
aggressiveness types. This confirms that broker identifiers do not add additional 













Buys and Sells Mean Difference in Returns: Pre/Post Broker Anonymity 
This table summarises the results of buy and sell mean price reaction for ULOs and matched 
DLOs/MO around the event date of the removal of broker identifiers. The difference in returns between 
the matched orders before and after removal of broker identifiers is examined for each order 
aggressiveness type (ALO, LALO, ALOC and MO). Values in parentheses are t-values for the null 
hypothesis that the difference in the mean is zero. All return differences are expressed as percentages. 
 
  
Time Interval  
1 min 2 min 5 min 10 min Day Close 
Panel A: Aggressive limit order cancellation     
       Buys      
          (ULOs - DLOs)PRE   -  (ULOs - DLOs)POST 
-0.033 -0.072 0.030 -0.057 -0.142 
       t-statistic (-0.18) (-0.70) (1.17) (-0.24) (-0.48) 
       Sells      
          (ULOs - DLOs)PRE   -  (ULOs - DLOs)POST 
-0.007 -0.052 -0.028 -0.120 -0.243 
       t-statistic (-0.26) (-0.86) (-0.74) (-0.68) (-1.01) 
Panel B: Aggressive limit orders      
       Buys      
           (ULOs - DLOs)PRE   -  (ULOs - DLOs)POST 
-0.004 0.011 -0.017 0.009 0.088 
       t-statistic (-0.36) (0.83) (-1.08) (0.50) (1.47) 
       Sells      
             (ULOs - DLOs)PRE   -  (ULOs - DLOs)POST 
0.004 0.017 0.010 -0.029 -0.053 
       t-statistic (0.39) (1.43) (0.64) (-1.42) (-0.88) 
Panel C: Less-aggressive limit orders      
       Buys      
             (ULOs - DLOs)PRE   -  (ULOs - DLOs)POST 
0.022 0.029 0.042 0.063 0.065 
       t-statistic (1.24) (1.36) (1.49) (1.52) (0.63) 
       Sells      
             (ULOs - DLOs)PRE   -  (ULOs - DLOs)POST 
-0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.035 0.107 
       t-statistic (-0.15) (-0.09) (-0.18) (-0.94) (0.67) 
Panel D: Market orders      
       Buys      
            (ULOs - DLOs)PRE   -  (ULOs - DLOs)POST 
0.009 0.025 -0.073 -0.066 0.178 
       t-statistic (0.50) (1.24) (-1.83) (-1.95) (1.30) 
       Sells      
           (ULOs - DLOs)PRE   -  (ULOs - DLOs)POST 
0.004 0.005 -0.006 -0.008 0.012 









Buys and Sells Mean Difference in Returns: Hidden Orders  
 
This table summarises the results of buy and sell mean return difference for ULOs. The difference in 
returns between matched ULOs before and after removal of broker identifiers is examined for each 
level of order aggressive type (ALO, LALO and ALOC). Values in parentheses are t-values for the null 
hypothesis that the difference in the mean is zero. All return differences are expressed as percentages.  
 
  
Time Interval  
1 min 2 min 5 min 10 min Day Close 
Panel A: Aggressive limit order cancellation     
       Buys      
ULOs PRE   - ULOs POST  -0.005 -0.015 -0.034 -0.002 -0.017 
                t-statistic (-0.22) (-0.66) (-1.35) (-0.06) (-0.15) 
       Sells      
ULOs PRE   - ULOs POST  0.032 0.034 0.017 0.046 0.127 
                t-statistic (1.54) (1.30) (0.60) (1.35) (1.42) 
      
Panel B: Aggressive limit orders    
       Buys      
ULOs PRE   - ULOs POST  -0.001 0.002 -0.016 0.011 -0.017 
                t-statistic (-0.05) (0.24) (-1.39) (0.55) (-0.39) 
       Sells      
ULOs PRE   - ULOs POST  0.015 0.006 0.015 0.002 0.067 
                t-statistic (1.51) (1.19) (1.26) (0.12) (1.51) 
      
Panel C: Less-aggressive limit orders    
       Buys      
ULOs PRE   - ULOs POST  0.003 0.021 0.019 0.014 0.040 
                t-statistic (0.34) (1.60) (1.40) (0.62) (0.61) 
       Sells      
ULOs PRE   - ULOs POST  0.017 0.010 0.011 -0.005 0.078 
                t-statistic (1.40) (0.54) (0.55) (-0.26) (1.01) 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
This paper examines the information content of ULOs on the ASX, as well as 
assessing the effects of removing of broker identifiers from trading screens on the 
information content between various order-placement strategies. Results from this 
analysis demonstrate three key findings. First, the submission of an aggressive ULO 
leads to a greater price movement in the opposite quote comparable to a similar DLO 
when keeping the level of pre-trade transparency constant. Second, the removal of 
broker identifiers has no significant impact on the level of information content 
between the matched orders. This result is consistent across both order direction and 
the level of order aggressiveness. Third, there is no evidence that broker identifiers 
contain additional information within hidden orders for the first 10 minutes after order 
submission. This  suggests  that  undisclosed orders provide more  information  to 
the market than do broker identifiers.  
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